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Abstract
We propose a methodology for a novel type of discourse annotation whose model is tuned to the analysis of a text as narrative. This
is intended to be the basis of a “story bank” resource that would facilitate the automatic analysis of narrative structure and content.
The methodology calls for annotators to construct propositions that approximate a reference text, by selecting predicates and arguments
from among controlled vocabularies drawn from resources such as WordNet and VerbNet. Annotators then integrate the propositions
into a conceptual graph that maps out the entire discourse; the edges represent temporal, causal and other relationships at the level of
story content. Because annotators must identify the recurring objects and themes that appear in the text, they also perform coreference
resolution and word sense disambiguation as they encode propositions. We describe a collection experiment and a method for determining
inter-annotator agreement when multiple annotators encode the same short story. Finally, we describe ongoing work toward extending
the method to integrate the annotator’s interpretations of character agency (the goals, plans and beliefs that are relevant, yet not explictly
stated in the text).
1. Introduction
This paper describes a methodology for constructing a
novel type of language resource consisting of a corpus of
annotated textual stories. The annotation takes the form of
a single interconnected graph that encodes the entire dis-
course. Nodes in the graph represent spans of the refer-
ence text, objects in the story, and propositions (predicate-
argument structures) that convey actions, statives, and mod-
ifiers. All of the symbols are linked to formal ontolo-
gies. Nodes are connected by arcs that represent textual
connections such as causality and motivation. In addi-
tion, we describe an initial collection experiment and a
method for measuring inter-annotator agreement. We detail
in (Elson and McKeown, 2009) an annotation tool called
SCHEHERAZADE that elicits such story graphs from non-
expert annotators. In this paper, we focus on the procedure
for encoding a story graph from a reference text.
We have been motivated to develop this annotation scheme
by the lack of an existing language resource that covers all
these facets of a text. For example, large-scale annotation
projects have focused on identifying predicates and argu-
ments at the sentence level (Kingsbury and Palmer, 2002)
or the connections between sentences at the discourse level
(Prasad et al., 2008; Carlson et al., 2001). Temporal and
modal properties of a corpus have been separately mod-
eled (Pustejovsky et al., 2003). We are interested in a more
holistic view of a story, so that the interplay of many fea-
tures can be understood – our model involves word sense
disambiguation, coreference, interpretation of tense and as-
pect into a symbolic view of time and modality, and the
encoding of actions, statives and modifiers into proposi-
tional structures. In addition, we are currently extending
the model to include crucial elements of character agency
(goals, plans and beliefs) even when they are not stated in
the text. We believe that a corpus of narratives annotated
into story graphs (a “story bank”) would galvanize work
in this area of text understanding, and allow us to develop
the tools that reveal how stories work: the structure that
the narrator chooses, the roles that characters take on, the
similarities between stories and across genres, and so on.
In the following sections, we describe our method for syn-
thesizing several modes of annotation into a single proce-
dure in which annotators build a structure that reflects the
content of a reference text. Section 2 reviews our formal
representation. We outline the three stages of annotation
in Section 3: extraction of objects and themes, construc-
tion of predicate-argument structures, and assembly into a
single interconnected graph. In Section 4, we describe a
collection experiment and a method for calculating inter-
annotator agreement that measures the similarity between
two story graphs. Section 5 describes ongoing work in
eliciting implied information about character agency, which
was not included in the collection experiment. Finally, we
review related work and conclude.
2. Story graph approach
Following theorists such as (Bal, 1997), we define a “nar-
rative” discourse as one which refers to events that tran-
spire in the world of the story, ordered with temporal re-
lations and linked by threads of causality and motivation.
Our methodology guides annotators toward encoding the
underlying events present in a story, rather than the lex-
ical choice or other elements of the story’s realization in
text. In an earlier paper (Elson and McKeown, 2007), we
outline our method of encoding these events with a combi-
nation of propositions (predicate-argument structures) and
conceptual graphs. While this paper focuses on the encod-
ing process from the annotator’s perspective, this section
summarizes our approach to story representation.
Nodes in the conceptual graph represent actions, statives,
modifiers, time states, spans of reference text and meta-
data such as the characters, locations and props found in
the text. Action, stative and modifier nodes contain defini-
tional propositions. The predicate-argument structures are
adapted from the VerbNet lexical database (Kipper et al.,
2006) while a taxonomy of nouns and adjectival modifiers
are supplied by WordNet (Fellbaum, 1998). The arcs of
the conceptual graph include temporal relationships (which
actions take place at which time states or intervals), di-





















Figure 1: Schematic of a portion of a story graph.
direct consequence actions, if any) and equivalence rela-
tions between spans of reference text and their correspond-
ing propositions. Not all propositions need to describe ac-
tual story events; actions, statives and even entire “alternate
timelines” can be set to modalities including the obliga-
tions, beliefs and fears of characters. For example, a char-
acter can hope that something will not happen in the future
or has not happened in the past. Figure 1 illustrates a por-
tion of a story graph schematic, showing the first sentence
of a reference text, as well as objects, statives, actions and
points in time identified in the text by an annotator.
The reference text we will use in this paper is one of the
fables attributed to Aesop. We have developed our method-
ology using Aesop’s fables as a development corpus, but
our knowledge sources are not tuned to these stories or their
domain. In this paper, we will discuss a fable titled The Fox
and the Crow, which has been featured in other story repre-
sentation schemes (Ryan, 1991), and is reproduced below:
A Crow was sitting on a branch of a tree with a
piece of cheese in her beak when a Fox observed
her and set his wits to work to discover some way
of getting the cheese. Coming and standing under
the tree he looked up and said, “What a noble bird
I see above me! Her beauty is without equal, the
hue of her plumage exquisite. If only her voice is
as sweet as her looks are fair, she ought without
doubt to be Queen of the Birds.” The Crow was
hugely flattered by this, and just to show the Fox
that she could sing she gave a loud caw. Down
came the cheese, of course, and the Fox, snatch-
ing it up, said, “You have a voice, madam, I see:
what you want is wits.”
One important aspect of the story graph is that it is a static
model of the entire story, without a “beginning” or “end.”
The telling of the story – that is, the ordering of proposi-
tions that constitutes a narration of the graph from a be-
ginning to an ending – is given through the arcs that the
annotator provides between the spans of reference text and
their related proposition(s). As one progresses through the
reference text in a story graph from start to finish, one will
encounter arcs to propositional nodes attached to the sym-
bolic timeline. Many narratives, including Aesop’s, reveal
the actions in their timelines in a nonlinear order (i.e., with
jumps to the past or to the future and back again). While
this fable is strictly linear, the fox’s dialogue refers to a hy-
pothetical future.
2.1. Encoding tool
We have implemented and publicly released a graphical an-
notation tool that facilitates the process of encoding a refer-
ence text into a story graph. Figure 2 shows the main screen
as configured for annotating The Fox and the Crow. The
methodology we describe below takes place in the context
of the buttons and menus offered by this tool. The central
panel shows a timeline with states (called “Story Points”)
arranged in a linear graph. Alternate timelines can also be
accessed from this screen. The top-right and bottom-right
panels contain the reference text and a feedback text, re-
spectively. The latter is an automatically generated realiza-
tion of the story graph that uses syntactic frames from Verb-
Net and a model of tense and aspect assignment. It facil-
itates the encoding process by giving annotators a natural-
language equivalent of the story graph which they can com-
pare to the reference text at every step.
3. Annotation Procedure
The first task for an annotator is to read the text and fully
comprehend it. As a story graph is a discourse unit rather
than a sentential unit, it is important for the annotator to
take a holistic view of the text before beginning the encod-
ing process.
The method for creating a story graph from a reference text
involves three tasks. They need not occur sequentially; an
annotator can move back and forth as needed. After mak-
ing each change to the story graph, the annotator checks
the feedback text to ensure that the system has correctly
encoded the concept. The process terminates once the an-
notator feels that he or she has encoded the story with the
greatest amount of precision possible, given the formal lim-
itations of the representation. The tasks are:
1. Object extraction. Named entities, objects and rele-
vant themes or processes in the text are identified, as
well as their immutable statives (inherent properties).
2. Construction of propositions. Predicates are selected
for each action and stative. Arguments are then filled
in for each thematic role associated with each pred-
icate. Modifiers and negations, if any, are also as-
signed.
3. Assignment and linking. Propositions are assigned
to states and transitions on a timeline and linked to
corresponding spans of reference text. Modal (hypo-
thetical) events are grouped in separate timelines.
In this section, we describe each task in detail.
Figure 2: Main screen of the SCHEHERAZADE interface.
3.1. Object and theme extraction
After reading the text, the annotator first identifies the
“named entities” that occur. We use this term to refer to
objects and themes that are named by the annotator – even
if the story’s narrator does not assign names – so that they
can be invoked in multiple propositions. In other words,
the annotator performs coreference on the text by identi-
fying entities and assigning them unique identifiers; each
mention of the entity is then invoked by the identifier and
linked to the other mentions.
Figures 1 and 2 indicate the entities that are appropriate
for an annotator to extract from The Fox and the Crow: a
crow, a fox, some cheese, and a tree. The annotation tool al-
lows annotators to search for such entities from among a list
populated by a subset of WordNet (those synsets which can
serve as characters, locations, props, processes, and so on).
Figure 1 gives each instantiated object an identifier such
as crow1, but unless the annotator provides a name (such
as John), these are not exposed in the graphical interface.
Whenever a predicate calls for an Actor as an argument, for
instance, the interface presents a menu of all animate char-
acters that the annotator had extracted (such as in Figure 5).
The feedback text generator selects the correct determiner
and uses numerical disambiguators (the first man, the sec-
ond man) to reflect the coreference modeled in the story
graph. For example, in this story, all mentions of a fox
should refer to the same fox entity; only the first should be
realized as a fox, signaling a new character.
The fable in question includes several objects and themes
which only occur once. The annotator can declare a named
entity for these in the same manner, or simply invoke them
“on the fly” while constructing the propositions in which
they appear. In our reference fable, such cases include
the branch of the tree (which is modeled in Figure 2),
the plumage of the bird, the hue of that plumage, and in-
telligence (in the abstract). Objects and themes can be
used in composition, with an “of” relationship inferred:
hue(plumage(bird)) refers to the hue of the bird’s plumage.
Previous work in word sense disambiguation has shown
WordNet synsets to be very fine-grained, which can hurt
Figure 3: Searching in the character extraction panel.
inter-annotator agreement (Palmer et al., 2007). For exam-
ple, “fox” also represents the synset of “a shifty deceptive
person”; other distinctions can be far more subtle. We ad-
dress this issue in two ways. First, at the user interface
level, we make it clear when there is an ambiguity, and trace
the hyponymy of each synset. The annotator sees “fox, ca-
nine, carnivore” juxtaposed to “fox, deceiver, wrongdoer.”
Figure 3 shows a hyponymy trace appearing when the anno-
tator hovers the cursor over a particular result when search-
ing for “fox” during character extraction. The second tech-
nique is to limit ambiguities by selectively disassociating
certain words with their less-used synsets. Specifically, we
set a threshold for the information content a synset must
have to serve as an option for a word. This is calculated
from a model of the usage of each synset in a naturally oc-
curring corpus.
Annotators may invoke abstract entities. For instance, a
character may refer to a tree rather than some particular
tree, named or otherwise. They may also refer to groups
of entities in the singular. In The Fox and the Crow, this
is necessary several times: first, when the fox refers to the
crow as a noble bird, and second, to a hypothetical Queen
of [all] the birds.
Figure 4: Predicate selection panel showing search results
for “drop.”
3.2. Predicate and argument selection
After the annotator extracts named entities, she chooses the
best predicates and arguments to describe the actions, sta-
tives and modifiers that transpire in the text.
VerbNet has also been mapped to the large-scale annotation
project PropBank (Kingsbury and Palmer, 2002). There are
three key differences between PropBank and this project.
First, PropBank focuses on the sentence level; the result of
a story encoding is a single structure consisting of many
interconnected propositions. Second, there is not necessar-
ily a direct mapping from predicates in the reference text
to propositions in the story graph. As we will see, annota-
tors may alter or consolidate text to focus on the underlying
story events rather than the rhetoric. Third, PropBank fills
its arguments with spans of text, such as assigning a clause
to Arg0 or Arg1. Our representation discourages this use;
normally, an annotator chooses an element from a formal
taxonomy (such as a named entity) to serve as an argument.
For example, rather than highlight the text the window, the
annotator would select a named entity declared from the
correct WordNet window synset. If no formal symbol can
be found for an argument, the annotator can indicate a text
span as a last resort.
At the user interface level, the annotator searches for a verb,
stative or modifier predicate and is then presented with a list
of frames that match the query. The generation component
realizes an example phrase using placeholder arguments as
an aid for the annotator. For example, a search for “drop”
offers several frames with varying thematic roles: A char-
acter or prop drops, A character or prop drops a character
or prop, and others (see Figure 4).
Once the annotator selects the predicate, the interface
prompts her to select arguments. The selection panel
changes depending on the thematic role of the argument:
an Experiencer argument would present a list of extracted
characters, while a Stimulus argument which VerbNet re-
ports as compatible with a Communication would prompt
the user for a predicate to serve as the basis for a nested
dialogue proposition. Figure 5 shows the prompt for the
dropped object invoked by a “drop” predicate.
Sometimes the action or stative choice is clear and obvious.
For example, the reference text includes the clause when a
Fox observed her. To encode this, the annotator searches
for “observe” and finds “something observes something.”
She can then select the observing thing and the observed
thing. The feedback text replies, The fox observed the crow.
At other times, a fair amount of simplification is necessary.
For example, our guidelines have annotators phrase pas-
sive voice statements as active voice where possible. In
The crow was hugely flattered by this, the annotator would
model it as if it said The fox flattered the crow. While the
fox’s statements are what truly flattered the crow, we ask
annotators to simplify in cases such as these, creating a
“canonical” form that facilitates later analysis.
However, there is a qualitative difference introduced in this
rephrasing. In The crow was hugely flattered by this, it is
clear that the flattery is the crow’s belief. The fox flattered
the crow reads as though the fox’s intention was to flat-
ter the crow and he succeeded in doing so. The correct
meaning can be made clear by making the proposition an
argument to an encapsulating belief proposition: The crow
believed that the fox had flattered it.
There are other examples in this fable where forcing the an-
notator to choose arguments from a controlled vocabulary
steers her to focus on content rather than rhetoric. Idioms
and figures of speech are replaced by simpler synonyms.
For instance, the story includes the following:
Coming and standing under the tree he looked up
and said, “What a noble bird I see above me!”
An appropriate encoding of this sentence would be:
standUnder(fox1, tree1)
say(fox1, crow1, noble(crow1))
These propositions include only the essential details of the
sentence. It is not important that the fox identifies the crow
as a crow (that is never in question), just that the fox de-
clares the crow to be noble. The wording of the fox’s di-
alogue is stripped of its flourish. (While “stand under” is
not in WordNet, “under” is one of the prepositions listed as
being compatible with “stand” in VerbNet.)
We do not prescribe some number of propositions for the
annotator to construct. Rather, the annotator uses as many
as needed to fully capture the story content (to the extent
permitted by the formal restrictions). A sentence may map
to more than one proposition.
Figure 5: An argument selection panel, which is shown once a predicate is selected.
3.3. Time, mode, connectives
Once the annotator constructs individual propositions, she
must attach them to the overall scaffold of the story graph.
The connective properties we ask annotators to consider in-
clude the following:
1. Temporal relationships. Each action and stative is
linked to one of the discrete states that make up the
main timeline. Actions may be instantaneous or con-
tinuous over a span of time. Two propositions share a
state or interval only if they occur simultaneously. The
timeline represents the order of events as they occur
in the story-world, as opposed to the order in which
events are told in the original discourse. Annotators
may assign text spans to be unbounded, with no begin-
ning or no ending. We plan to add support for habitual
and cyclical events in the near future.
2. Modal labels. An action and stative can be marked
as being hypothetical rather than actual, especially if
they are conditionals or occur as an obligation, goal
or belief of a character (Ryan, 1991). For example,
in the familiar fable of the Milkmaid and Her Pail,
the title character imagines an elaborate future for her-
self (counting her eggs before they are hatched). Se-
quences of hypothetical actions can be collocated in a
single imaginary timeline.
3. Modification. Modifier propositions are linked to the
actions, statives or other modifiers to which they ap-
ply.
4. Causality. If the text makes it clear that one action
happens as a direct consequence of another, such as
with the “so” and “because” key words, the annotator
marks a causal edge from the cause to the result.
5. Reference text spans. The entire reference text is
included in the story graph, and spans of text can
be connected with arcs to the nodes that approximate
them. The correlation of a reference text to its encoded
equivalent allows us to combine lexical and syntactic
features with proposition-oriented features when pro-
cessing story graphs. As we mentioned earlier, the
links to the text spans also preserve the “telling” of
the story, in terms of the order in which propositions
are narrated – a crucial variable for reader response.
In the case of The Fox and the Crow, the temporal flow is
monotonic; no flashbacks or flash-forwards are involved.
Each event is assumed to occur subsequent to the one be-
fore, except when the word and is used in the text, in which
case two propositions are assumed to co-occur. The use
of and is a shorthand, however – it does not prove or dis-
prove a temporal relationship. The annotator must decide
the most likely span for each event and determine when
events co-occur based on all available evidence. An al-
ternate timeline can be used to indicate that an event took
place at some point in the “past” or “future” whose exact
placement with respect to the other events in the story is
unknowable.
The most significant causal link in this fable runs from the
singing of the crow to the falling of the cheese. Our guide-
lines advise annotators to indicate a causal link if the text
explicitly mentions such a connection, or if one event is the
sole reason that another occurs at all (or the joint reason
with other propositions). Adjacent segments of dialogue
are not necessarily causally connected, but a character’s ac-
tion can be a consequence of another character’s speech.
Figure 6 shows the result of these three steps on The Fox
and the Crow. The two columns of nodes represent ref-
erence text spans and action/stative nodes; the arrows that
cross from one column to the other indicate equivalence.
The vertical arrows and braces among the left sides of the
propositions show the temporal arrangement; for simplic-
ity, all actions and statives are illustrated as sequential or
simultaneous points rather than overlapping intervals. The
remaining arrows are causal edges.
4. Measuring agreement
In this section, we describe an initial collection experiment
and a measurement of inter-annotator agreement that de-
pends upon a graph similarity metric. The notion of inter-
annotator agreement is complex in the case of the story
graph, for several reasons. First, the graph itself contains
a multitude of selections from among very large controlled
vocabularies. Second, there is a significant amount of sub-
jective interpretation built into a story graph. Although the
guidelines strive to make clear rules for “cutting through
rhetoric,” a story is a received construction, and varying in-
ferences are to be expected. The English language also per-
mits cases of total ambiguity for which a judgment call is
necessary. This dynamic lends itself to a study of varying
subjective interpretations among readers; however, in the
present case our aim is to find the commonalities between
two parallel story graphs of the same reference text.




































Figure 6: Complete encoding for The Fox and the Crow.
each created story graphs for a set of 20 of Aesop’s fa-
bles. Both subjects were undergraduates and native En-
glish speakers. It took several hours to guide them through
training and an initial encoding; as they became familiar
with the tool, the required time per fable (80 to 175 words)
dropped to 30-45 minutes. The annotators created an aver-
age of one proposition for every 9 words of reference text.
To measure inter-annotator agreement, we begin with a
metric for comparing two propositions or objects. We adopt
Lin’s (1998) information-content metric for measuring the
semantic similarity of two WordNet senses (those of the
predicates or object types, respectively). For propositions a
and b, this measure constitutes half of the similarity score
s(a, b); the balance is the similarity between the respective










where c(a, b) is information-content similarity between the
two predicates; if a and b are propositions, r(a, b) is the
number of arguments that each contains, and p(a, b, i) re-
trieves the two arguments in a and b for some thematic role
i (e.g., the two Agent arguments for some two actions). If a
and b are objects, the recursive term is ignored.
We then compute the overall similarity between two story
graphs by algorithmically aligning the two graphs together,
matching the analogous propositions (that is, the pairs that
most likely encode the same concept from the reference
text). After finding the average similarity between each
matched pair, we assign a score penalty for the “singleton”
propositions in either graph for which analogues were never
found.
To calculate the kappa coefficient (Cohen, 1960) for mea-
suring similarity above chance agreement, we must first de-
termine chance in this context. We do this by generating
two random story graphs – picking both predicates and ar-
guments at random from among the lexemes found in the
corpus – and finding their similarity to one another using
the same method as described above.
The resulting kappa is .51, which indicates moderate agree-
ment. We believe this is an encouraging sign that annota-
tors can reliably extract propositions from a text, even when
the concepts are presented rhetorically. We further believe
that we can improve kappa by implementing heuristics for
detecting and normalizing certain types of “semantic para-
phrases,” when slightly different predicates are used to en-
code the same concept from the reference text. Our simi-
larity algorithm already connects verb actions and their de-
rived adjectival statives.
5. Interpretative assessments
All the annotations we have discussed have been based on
story content which is stated in the discourse itself. In this
section, we outline ongoing work in extending our model
and methodology to capture the interpretative connections
that give a story its cohesion.
The factors that give The Fox and the Crow its moral
“point” are left unstated: that the crow’s vanity was its
downfall, and that the fox’s ultimately successful plan was
always to capitalize on this character flaw. More gener-
ally, a skilled narrator does not always state each charac-
ter’s goals and motivations, but these are essential aspects
of a story as it is understood by a reader (Bruner, 1991).
Many of the interesting connections between stories do not
involve similarities between actions, but rather those be-
tween the goals, the plans and the conflicts that arise.
We are currently extending our methodology to capture
three key aspects of character agency: goals, plans and be-
liefs. We call this the interpretative layer of the story graph,
as opposed to the stated layer. Our purpose is to under-
stand the motivation, if any, behind each stated proposition.
We draw from theorists since Aristotle who have noted that
dramatic narratives hinge on the disconnects between what
characters know and how they act. Annotator interpreta-
tions, of course, will vary more as we depart from the writ-
ten word. A story graph becomes more of a model of the
received story than an absolute record of story content.
Structurally, the interpretive layer consists of more propo-
sitions attached to timelines. The difference is that each is
marked as being part of a goal, plan or belief that is un-
stated and relevant to the story. A goal is a truth value that
a character desires to come to pass; a plan indicates a se-
quence of (possibly branching) actions intended to reach a
goal; a belief illustrates the character’s implied world view.
These nodes are connected to nodes in the stated layer of
the graph. The arcs that span the two layers include:
1. Attempt to cause: Indicates that the motivation be-
hind an action is to cause a goal or plan to occur.
2. Precondition for: Sets one aspect of a plan as a pre-
condition for the transpiring of a goal or another plan.
3. Would cause: Indicates belief that one proposition,
should it come to pass, would cause another.
4. Fulfills: Links an action to a goal or plan that it actu-
alizes.
The methodology for assigning interpretative-layer nodes is
to specify the most relevant goals, plans and beliefs that act
as motivations or explanations for the stated content. The
Fox and the Crow is notable for its intersecting plans. Each
character has a motive for its actions; the key to the story
is that the crow’s plan to impress the fox is itself part of
the fox’s plan to get the cheese. The fox does not state his
plan at the beginning of the story; the “unfolding,” where
the fox’s plan is revealed upon its actualization, happens at
the end. The middle of the story consists of the fox taking
actions to actualize an unstated plan.
We have run a formative evaluation in eliciting the interpre-
tative layer of the story graph, involving experts in literary
theory. We found that the expressiveness of the model was
sufficient for capturing motivations behind actions in five
stories in the Aesop corpus, and that different annotators
identified disjoint but similar motivations.
6. Related work
SCHEHERAZADE functions as aWYSIWYM (what you see
is what you meant) tool, in that it allows domain experts
rather than knowledge engineers to work in a formal rep-
resentation – with the assistance of a graphical interface
and real-time, automatic feedback text (Power et al., 1998).
Biller et al. (2005) describe a WYSIWYM editor in which
the representation, like ours, is a conceptual graph that in-
corporates the VerbNet and WordNet linguistic resources.
However, compared to this work, our work is geared to-
ward narrative, and includes more complete representations
of time, modality and agency.
Conceptual graphs have previously been considered as a
formalism for interpreting story content, both in theory
(Bearman and Stovel, 2000) and practice (Min et al., 2008).
The QUEST approach, in particular, models a story in terms
of action/stative nodes and arcs that represent relations such
as causality (Graesser et al., 1991; Christian and Young,
2003). However, we know of no previous collection project
to allow annotators to encode stories in the QUEST formal-
ism; while the recent ReQUEST project uses the technique
for computer/human co-authoring (Riedl et al., 2008), the
use of a WYSIWYM editor in this context is novel.
The conceptual graph is by no means the only represen-
tation proposed for modeling narratives; to name a few,
planning has been applied to plot generation (Riedl and
Young, 2005), and logic-based formalisms can capture as-
pects of commonsense reasoning (Mueller, 2004), psychol-
ogy (Hobbs and Gordon, 2005) and character agency (Ra-
paport, 1986). These formalisms are more suited for au-
tomatic computation of story content, and can be rigid in
their coverage, where our notion of a story graph is more
descriptive in nature.
Inference of agency is an active area in its own right (Pol-
lack, 1990). While computational analysis of style is a
useful tool for literary scholarship (Mostellar and Wallace,
1984; Lee, 2007), our intention is to assist in the analysis
of deeper structural and thematic connections within and
between narratives.
7. Conclusion and Future Directions
In this paper, we described a methodology for collecting de-
tailed formal encodings of narratives. The model exposes
a feature space for analysis of discourse as a narrative act,
with emphasis on actions of characters, time and modality.
We also described a similarity metric for calculating inter-
annotator agreement. In an initial experiment, two anno-
tators achieved moderate agreement when creating parallel
story graphs for 20 fables. In the future, we will grow the
Aesop corpus, expand to contemporary genres and perform
learning experiments from the data. We will also develop
our extension of the model to cover some of the interpreta-
tive facets of stories, expanding the user interface and run-
ning a new collection experiment that elicits encodings of
the inner worlds of characters.
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